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Abstract 
We investigate whether the merger announcement dates provided in a popular 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) database, SDC, serve as accurate event dates 
for estimating the wealth effects of mergers on target firms located in Turkey. 
We find that 74% of SDC’s merger announcement dates are preceded by 
merger-related events such as merger rumors, target firms’ search for potential 
acquirers, and early stage merger negotiation announcements. Target cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) estimates around these early dates are almost twice as 
large as the CAR estimates around SDC’s merger announcement dates. We 
argue that our findings have implications for the recently flourishing cross-
border M&A literature. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The empirical Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) literature has been enriched in the past few years 
by a growing number of studies analyzing the takeover mechanisms in cross-border 
transactions.
1
 One of the reasons behind the growing popularity of international M&A research is 
the abundant and available transaction level data in commercial M&A databases. The literature 
survey in Mulherin and Simsir (2014) reveal that the majority of the studies in the literature rely 
on Thomson Reuters’ Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database to gather their samples. 
SDC’s convenient access to a wealth of data items through online search bypasses the time-
consuming data collection stage in typical empirical research projects. Therefore, with the help 
of SDC, researchers are now able to work with increasingly larger datasets, where the number of 
data points can easily reach tens of thousands.  
 
The advantages of using datasets from SDC come with caveats, however. Netter, 
Stegemoller and Wintoki (2011) warn researchers that SDC’s M&A coverage becomes more 
complete only after the early 1990s. The authors also demonstrate that SDC has vague 
definitions of merger types and missing observations in the “deal value” field, which are 
important data sources for researchers. Boone and Mulherin (2007) show that the biased 
termination provision data in SDC produce incorrect analysis and conclusions on the relationship 
between termination provisions and toeholds, deal size and judicial decisions. Officer (2007) 
indicates that the acquisition multiple data provided by SDC (e.g., deal value to EBITDA, price 
to earnings per share) are missing and inaccurate for many deals in his sample.  
 
                                                          
1
 Cakici, Hessel and Tandon (1996) study the merger outcomes in foreign acquisitions of US target firms. Rossi and 
Volpin (2004) investigate the determinants of international M&As by focusing on the differences in laws and 
regulation across countries. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) analyze the returns to US acquirers in cross-border 
deals. Bris and Cabolis (2008) examine the interaction between takeover outcomes and shareholder protection and 
accounting standards in the acquirer firms’ countries. Mantecon (2009) discusses the alternative risk management 
tools that the merging firms could employ in cross-border acquisitions. Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2009) show that 
acquirers are better off when they acquire targets that are located in the emerging markets. Ferreira, Massa and 
Matos (2010) study the role of institutional investors in cross-border M&As. Bhagat, Malhotra and Zhu (2011) 
investigate whether the cross-border mergers undertaken by acquirers from the emerging economies create value. 
Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012) analyze the determinants of cross-border M&As, such as accounting standards, 
geography, bilateral trade between the merging firms’ countries and the recent changes in the valuations of the target 
firms’ stock markets. Finally, Makaew (2012) demonstrates that the cross-border M&A volume displays a wave 
pattern, following the trends in the business cycle. 
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In this paper, we investigate whether the deal announcement dates provided in SDC are 
accurate for Turkish transactions. Announcement dates are frequently used by researchers to 
measure the wealth effects of announced mergers, typically through event studies. Therefore, the 
accuracy of event dates is essential in event studies for achieving unbiased abnormal return 
estimates. For a sample of US transactions, Mulherin and Simsir (2014) show, for example, that 
about 24% of the deal announcement dates provided in SDC are preceded by merger rumors, 
failed transactions, and unsolicited offers made by bidders to the target firms. The authors show 
that there are significant market reactions around these events, and ignoring them - as many of 
the papers in the literature do - leads to biased target abnormal returns estimates in event studies. 
Following a similar methodology, we examine the frequency of such early merger-related events 
in Turkish transactions and the potential biases arising from their exclusion from event studies.  
 
We download from SDC a sample of completed deals in which target firms are Turkish 
and the deal announcement dates are between January 1
st
, 2005 and December 31
st
, 2011. Our 
search results in 105 transactions. We then search the Borsa Istanbul (BIST), Capital Markets 
Board of Turkey (CMBT) Bulletins, and national newspapers to determine whether the target 
firms are involved in merger-related activities within the two year period before formal merger 
announcement dates that are provided in SDC. We find 78 deals where the target firms 
experience merger-related events, such as merger rumors and search for buyer type of 
announcements. Because SDC records some of these early events in their “Original Date 
Announced” field, we refer to these events as “ODA events”. The formal merger announcement 
dates are recorded in SDC’s “Date Announced” field; hence, we identify the regular merger 
announcements as “DA events”. After identifying ODA and DA events and dates for each deal, 
we run event studies around these dates to see whether markets react to the released events. We 
find that the mean target Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) estimated five trading days 
before and after ODA is 6.7%, while the mean target CARs around DA over the same event 
window is only 3.3%. Therefore, for Turkish transactions, ignoring the merger-related events 
released at ODA leads to severe biases in target CAR estimates. We ascribe the significant 
market reactions around ODA to the fact that M&A transactions in Turkey are publicized much 
more often than in other markets, leading to frequent but small reactions in the stock market. 
Therefore, any study that attempts to calculate target CARs using a single event date, such as 
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DA, is severely flawed. Following Mulherin and Simsir (2014), we correct this bias by 
accumulating target abnormal returns over the entire period between ODA and DA. When such a 
correction is made, the mean target CAR figure readjusts to 9.6%.  
 
One of the potential remedies to capture the market reactions to the merger-related events 
taking place before the formal announcement dates is to extend the event window in the pre-
announcement period. Many researchers start accumulating target abnormal returns 63 or 126 
trading days before the announcement dates (Schwert (1996)). As we show in the next section, 
the median of the number of calendar days between the ODA and the DA is 182, which 
corresponds to 125 trading days. Hence, the event windows that start 63 or 126 trading days 
before the merger announcement dates fail to capture a significant portion of the market 
reactions around the early events. 
 
The second method of estimating the wealth effects of mergers on target firm 
shareholders is to calculate bid premiums. Bid premiums do not make use of the stock market 
data around announcement dates; it involves comparing the offer price with target’s stock price 
(called the “benchmark price”) before the merger announcement date. Because SDC does not 
consistently record offer price data, especially for small transactions, using SDC to estimate bid 
premiums is not always feasible. The lack of offer price data in SDC is a more severe problem 
for Turkish transactions: the information available in SDC enables us to estimate bid premiums 
for only 21 deals. We thus hand-collect offer price data for the remaining deals and estimate bid 
premiums for a total of 56 deals. Hence, our approach enables us to more than double the 
number of bid premium observations in our sample. We then estimate bid premiums using 
benchmark prices that are defined with respect to DA and ODA. The mean bid premiums that are 
estimated using benchmark prices before DA is 18.4% while the mean bid premiums that are 
estimated using benchmark prices before ODA is 28.4%. Hence, the benchmark price in bid 
premium estimates should be selected using ODA as the event date rather than DA.  
 
Our findings have implications to the cross-border M&A literature, where a significant 
number of papers have investigated the wealth effects of mergers and estimated target CARs and 
bid premiums using the announcement dates provided in SDC. Given that the sample sizes in 
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cross-border M&A studies are quite large, hand-collecting the event dates from national news 
sources is very costly. In addition, researchers may lack multi-lingual skills or knowledge of the 
local business environments to perform news searches in the country of interest. For instance, 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) study the determinants of bid premiums using a sample of 4,007 
takeovers that span 35 countries (Table 7, page 294). Bris and Cabolis (2008) estimate matching-
acquisition-adjusted target CARs for a sample of 241 deals from 31 countries (Table 5, page 
629). Ferreira, Massa and Matos (2010) calculate target CARs for 176 deals from at least 26 
countries (Table 12, page 639). If the M&A markets in the other emerging markets have similar 
characteristics to that of in Turkey, ignoring the possibility of ODA events could lead to biased 
estimates of the wealth effects of announced mergers. Despite its costs, researchers should take 
extra caution in identifying the event dates while running event studies in emerging countries. 
 
The wealth effects of mergers on target firm shareholders are considerably larger in 
developed countries than in emerging countries. In the US, the mean target CARs are in the 
vicinity of 25-30% while bid premiums range from 40-50% (Eckbo (2009)). In Europe, the 
samples are more heterogeneous than those in the US, due to the fact that the Euro area consists 
of countries with differing M&A regulations, but the target CAR estimates vary between 10% - 
20% (Campa and Hernando (2004), Goergen and Renneboog (2004), Martynova and Renneboog 
(2011), Craninckx and Huyghebaert (2011) and Geranio and Zanotti (2012)). 
2
 In emerging 
countries, target CARs and bid premium estimates are much lower. Sehgal, Banerjee and 
Deisting (2012) analyze the mergers in BRICS countries (Brasil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa) and find that the average target CARs over the (-1,+1) event period relative to the merger 
announcement date are 1.95%. Song et al (2011) report that the mean CARs experienced by 
target firms in Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia over the (-1,+1) event window is 2.69% 
(calculated from Table 4). Wong and Cheung (2009) estimate CARs for targets in Hong Kong, 
China, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, and South Korea and find that the mean target CARs over the 
(-1,0) period is -0.24%. The authors studying the wealth effects of mergers on target firm 
shareholders in emerging economies usually cite the problem of information leakage before 
formal announcement dates (Pop (2006)). The studies argue that the change in stock prices of 
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 The average target CAR estimates for the European Leveraged Buyout (LBO) deals are around 25-30% 
(Renneboog, Simons and Wright (2007) and Andres, Betzer and Weir (2007)).  
6 
 
target firms at the formal merger announcement dates does not reflect the true effects of mergers 
on target firm shareholders due to the significant runups in the pre-announcement period. Our 
suspicion is that the low takeover premiums estimated in emerging economies could partially be 
explained by the aforecited estimation problem rather than the commonly cited structural factors. 
 
Our findings, taken together with those presented in Mulherin and Simsir (2014), provide 
further evidence on the structural differences between the takeover markets in developed and 
emerging economies. The first major distinction is that the incidence of merger-related events in 
the pre-announcement period is much higher in Turkey (74%) than in the US (24%). One of the 
possible explanations for the significantly higher frequency of ODA events in Turkey is that the 
insider trading laws in the emerging economies tend to be more lenient than the developed 
economies (Bhattacharya et.al (2000) and Griffin, Hirschey and Kelly (2011)). Lenient trading 
regulations allow insiders to trade on their private information, leading to a slow diffusion of 
their private information in the stock market. In the case of mergers, when the volume of the 
private information trading reaches a critical point, merger-related events start to materialize 
either through merger rumors or target firms’ own revelation of the ongoing merger negotiations. 
The second difference between the US and Turkish markets is the relative magnitude of the 
market reactions around the ODA events. In the US, target firm stocks appreciate an average of 
18.6% on the merger-related early date and another 13.8% on the final merger announcement 
date. In contrast, the average increase in the stock prices of Turkish target firms is 6.7% on the 
initial merger-related event date and 3.3% on the eventual formal merger announcement date. 
While the price reactions to target stocks around the two event dates are of comparable 
magnitude in the US, the average market reaction around the initial merger-related events in 
Turkish markets is about twice as large as the market reaction at the final announcement dates. 
As we show in the next section, the majority of the early events in Turkish markets (51%) are 
announced by target firms to disclose the early stage merger negotiations with bidders. In the 
US, the frequency of these events is only 13%. Hence, the large market reactions at the ODA 
events in Turkey are due to merging firms’ voluntary or involuntary (e.g., as a response to 
excessive trading in the stock market) disclosure of the merger plans to the public. 
3
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 We wish to note that the M&A activity in emerging markets has recently drawn considerable interest from 
academic researchers. The range of topics in this field include the determinants of M&A activity (Agarwal and 
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The volume of M&A transactions in Turkey has been increasing since the early 2000s, 
mostly due to political stabilization, high economic growth, and increased Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). Parallel to the developments in the M&A market, academic M&A research 
has seen an increasing number of studies on corporate takeovers in the past decade, on topics 
such as the overall M&A activity in Turkey (Ertaş (1998), Jensen (2010), Akdoğu (2011) and 
Akdoğu (2012)), the effects of mergers on the financial performances of merging firms (Erkan 
(2003), Mandacı (2005), Akın and Kılıç (2008) and Akben-Selçuk (2008)), and detailed case 
studies on specific mergers (Arslan (2007), Bumin and Cengiz (2009) and Yıldız-Tulum and 
Aytekin (2009)). Our study relates closely to the set of papers that examine the wealth effects of 
mergers on acquirer and target firm shareholders. Mandacı (2004) analyzes 12 BIST-listed target 
firms that experienced a takeover between 1999 and 2003. The author finds that the mean target 
CARs over the (-5,+5) event window is 9.6%. Çukur and Eryiğit (2006) investigate mergers in 
the banking sector in 2004 and 2005. The number of observations in their sample (five) does not 
allow for an in-depth analysis of target CARs, though the authors show that target firms 
experience positive CARs around the merger announcement or merger initiation dates. Tanyeri 
(2008) analyzes 19 mergers in the banking industry over the 2004-2006 period and finds that the 
mean target CARs over the five-day period around the announcement date is 5.57%. Oelger and 
Schiereck (2011) examine the wealth effects of mergers on acquiring firm shareholders using 
119 deals over the period of 1992 and 2010 and find that the mean acquirer CARs over the (-
10,+10) event window around the merger announcement dates is 3.35%. Finally, Hekimoğlu and 
Tanyeri (2011) analyze full and partial acquisitions of non-financial Turkish firms between 1991 
and 2009. The authors download their sample from SDC and end up with 142 observations that 
conform to the above criteria. The mean target CARs over the (-1,+1) event window is 8.56% in 
full acquisitions and 2.25% in partial sales.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data formation steps, 
and the variables that we use in our analysis. Section 3 shows our empirical results, basically the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Bhattacharjea (2006)), the effect of investor protection on merger outcomes (Pan et.al (2010)), performance and 
characteristics of acquiring firms (Lin and Lee (2010), Chi, Sun and Young (2011) and Yen, Chou and Andre 
(2013)) and target firms (Zhu and Jog (2012)).  
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target CAR and the bid premium estimates. In Section 4, we test whether our findings in the 
univariate analysis hold in a multivariate setting. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Data 
 
We use SDC’s “Non-US Mergers and Acquisitions” database to create our sample. We 
download from SDC the deals that satisfy the following criteria: (i) deal announcement dates are 
between 1 January 2005 and 31 December 2011, (ii) targets are publicly listed Turkish firms and 
(iii) the announced deals are eventually completed. We do not impose any filter for the acquirer 
firms. Our initial search results in 118 transactions. We eliminate duplicate observations where 
target firms appear in SDC more than once within five calendar days of the deal announcement 
dates. The resulting sample consists of 105 transactions. We use Stockground, a local financial 
database specializing in Turkish securities, to gather the accounting and the stock price 
information of the target firms in our sample. 
4
 
5
    
 
The distinguishing element of our study is the investigation of merger-related events 
before the merger announcement dates reported in SDC. For the 105 deals in our sample, we 
obtain merger-related information from news sources such as national newspapers (through the 
search engine in Stockground), BIST, CMBT Bulletins, and Public Disclosure Platform (PDP) 
starting two years before the announcement dates of the transactions. 
6
 BIST and CMBT 
Bulletins aim to disseminate new and material information regarding the operations and 
financials of the public companies to the investors as quickly as possible. PDP is a search 
platform that combines the announcements located in the two databases. Hence, M&A types of 
                                                          
4
 We considered DataStream for gathering the financials of the target firms. DataStream does not keep the financials 
of the target firms that are delisted from the BIST after they are acquired, and it lacks some of the key financials of 
the not-delisting target firms. These problems with DataStream lead us to use Stockground as our primary data 
source. 
5
 We should note that we did not verify from alternative sources the completeness of the coverage of the SDC 
database for Turkish mergers. We are also unable to comment on the accuracy of the key deal characteristics (e.g., 
percent-owned after transaction) that are provided by the SDC. Our study focuses solely on the proper use of the 
merger announcement dates for the deals that appear in the SDC database. 
6
 Except for one deal, all merger-related events appear within one calendar year of the merger announcement dates. 
Hence, the two year pre-announcement window is practically equivalent to a one-year window.  
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corporate announcements, including early stage merger-related events, are expected to appear in 
these databases.
 7
 
 
In Table 1, we summarize the frequency and content of the merger-related news 
appearing prior to SDC’s announcement dates. In 78 deals, we are able to find a merger-related 
event that the target firms are involved in before DA. In 40 of them, target firms announce early 
stage merger negotiations with the bidders. In the majority of the cases, the merging parties state 
that the negotiations between the two parties have begun but a definitive agreement is not yet 
reached. In the remaining cases, the merging firms announce that they reached an agreement for 
the merger, meaning that the DA provided in SDC is incorrect. The second most common 
merger-related event occurring before DA is merger rumors. In 19 of the deals, target firms are 
rumored to be takeover candidates in the national press. The merging firms typically do not 
confirm these rumors and notify PDP, stating that no material information exists which they 
could share at that point with the public. The third most common corporate event in the pre-DA 
period is the search-for-buyer type of announcements by target firms. 17 of the target firms in 
our sample publicly express their willingness to negotiate takeovers with the potential bidders. In 
some cases, they retain investment banks to start the auction process and notify PDP about their 
intentions of a sale.  
 
The second part of Table 1 summarizes the number of calendar days between the ODA 
and the DA with respect to the types of ODA events. For merger rumors, the average number of 
calendar days between the two dates is 235, while for search for buyer types of announcements 
the average is 223 calendar days. Compared to these two event types, early stage merger 
announcements are observed shortly before the DA, with a mean value of 145 calendar days.  
  
[Table 1] 
 
Table 2   summarizes the key deal and target firm characteristics of our sample. As Panel 
A shows, only 7.6% of the observations in our sample are tender offer deals (as defined in SDC). 
                                                          
7
 When our search results in multiple events for the same target firm, we record the first event as our primary 
merger-related event. Therefore, at most one merger-related event is associated with each deal.   
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While the volume of M&A transactions in Turkey has been increasing since the early 2000s, the 
frequency of tender offers and hostile transactions has been quite low. Yurtoğlu (2003) examines 
the ownership structures of publicly listed firms in Turkey and reports that gaining the control of 
target firms through hostile takeover bids is almost impossible due to large and controlling block 
holders in Turkish firms. Turkish deals are quite homogenous with respect to the method of 
payment as well. We have only one case where the target firm receives the stock of the acquirer 
as a payment. All remaining deals are cash deals. These two findings are consistent with those of 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) who find that no hostile takeover bids exist in Turkey and acquisitions 
are paid entirely in cash.  
 
We classify deals as intra-industry if the 2-digit SIC codes of the merging firms (as 
defined in SDC) match. The potential synergies between the merging parties are expected to be 
higher when the merging firms are in the same industry, or their assets are related with each 
other. In 38.1% of the deals in our sample, the assets of the merging firms are related to each 
other. Another potentially interesting deal characteristic is the “percent owned after transaction” 
variable, which is the percent ownership of the acquirer in the target firm after the transaction. A 
median post-merger equity ownership by acquirers of 51% means that the frequency of majority 
and minority acquisitions is nearly the same. The wealth effects of majority and minority 
acquisitions are quite different from each other as the latter may not let the acquirers use the 
potential gains arising due to the inefficient management of the assets of target firms. We create 
an indicator variable, “privatization dummy”, to capture the deals that involve privatization of 
the target firms. Our sample contains three privatization deals (Eregli Demir Celik, Tupras and 
Petkim) in which the Turkish government sold their stakes in these publicly traded companies. 
Finally, we categorize acquirer firms with respect to their nationalities and their public statuses. 
39% of the acquirers are public firms; 44.8%, non-Turkish. 
 
Another point we wish to make at this point relates to the nature of the transactions in 
Turkey. In developed economies, especially in the US, the wealth effects of mergers on target 
shareholders are typically examined through cases where the acquirers gain the majority control 
of the target firms. Acquirers could decide to squeeze out the dissenting shareholders once 
control of the target firms is achieved in the first step transaction. In Turkey, a significant portion 
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of the deals are equity sales. For instance, a blockholder in the target firm may sell his or her 
shares to a third party through private negotiations. When the deal is announced to the public, the 
reaction in the stock market is partially due to the expectation that the acquirer will acquire all of 
the outstanding shares of the target firm, and partially due to a revaluation effect. That is, the 
transaction price provides a new signal to the market about the post-merger stand alone value of 
the target firms.  
 
Panel B in Table 2 shows several financial characteristics of the target firms in our 
sample. The balance sheets and the income statements of the target firms are standardized with 
respect to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Because merger-related events 
and agreements could alter the financial statements and the market valuations of target firms, we 
use the data from their most recent financial statements that are filed before the merger 
announcement dates. The financial ratios that we consider in our study include target firm 
liquidity (quick ratio), operating profitability (EBITDA margin), market valuation 
(Price/Earnings ratio), size (book value of total assets) and capital structure (book leverage). 
Because financial firms structurally differ from non-financials, we exclude financial targets from 
our analysis in Panel B. We inflation-adjust all of the items in the financial statements of the 
target firms. The construction of the financial variables is explained in Table 2. 
 
[Table 2] 
 
We are able to calculate the financial ratios of 70 target firms in our sample. The mean 
and median quick ratios of 1.65 and 0.135, respectively, suggest that financial distress could be a 
serious problem for a portion of the target firms in our sample. The distribution of the operating 
profit margins of target firms is left skewed, with a median of 8.4% and a mean of zero. The 
median (book) value of target firms’ assets is 285 million Turkish Lira (202 million USD). The 
largest target firm in our sample has a (book) value of assets worth 43.4 billion Turkish Lira 
(32.1 billion USD).  
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3. Measuring Wealth Effects of Acquisitions 
 
We consider two methods for measuring the wealth effects of announced mergers on target firm 
shareholders. The first one involves running event studies to estimate the abnormal returns 
experienced by target firms around the merger announcement dates. The second one compares 
the offer price with the stock price of the target firm before the announcement date of the merger. 
We discuss each method in the following two subsections. 
 
3.1. Event Studies 
 
To estimate the abnormal returns experienced by target firm shareholders around the 
announcement of mergers, we run a one-factor model for each target firm in our sample. That is, 
we estimate the parameters of the one-factor model in the estimation window:  
 
      (1) 
 
where Rit is the security return and Rmt is the BIST-100 market return at time t. We run the one-
factor regression using an estimation window of (-819,-315) trading days relative to DA. We do 
not run the one-factor model if the number of observations in the estimation window is less than 
250. After estimating  using the daily returns in the estimation window, we calculate the 
expected (or normal) returns in the event period. The abnormal returns are then defined as 
realized returns minus expected returns. To show the sensitivity of our results with respect to the 
choice of the event windows, we accumulate abnormal returns over (-1,+1), (-5,+5), (-126,+5) 
and (-126,+126). To assess the statistical significance of our abnormal return estimates, we 
employ the standardized cross-sectional test that incorporates a correction for serial dependence 
(see Boehmer et.al (1991) for the original version of this test). As discussed in Campbell et.al 
(2010), this test performs quite well when the distribution of abnormal returns is non-normal. 
Because abnormal stock returns tend to be non-normal in non-US countries (Campbell et.al 
(2010)), the standardized cross-sectional test with serial dependence correction becomes more 
relevant for our sample of Turkish firms.  
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We also perform event studies around the original announcement dates. The procedure is 
the same as previously stated except that the estimation window is (-567,-63) trading days 
relative to the ODA. We wish to note here that the estimation window for calculating the 
parameters of the one-factor model around DA is chosen so that it does not overlap with the 
ODA dates. The maximum number of days between DA and ODA is 437 calendar days, 
corresponding to about 302 trading days. Therefore, ODA events do not appear in the (-819,-
315) estimation window and thus bias the parameter estimations. Because earlier merger-related 
events are not an issue for estimating abnormal returns around ODA, we shift the estimation 
window to (-567,-63). Note that both estimation windows contain 504 trading days. 
 
In Table 3, we examine the behavior of target abnormal returns around ODA and DA. In 
Panel A, we list the average abnormal returns to target firms starting five trading days before DA 
and ending five trading days after. The average abnormal returns in the pre-DA period are 
generally positive, though the statistical significance starts to appear on trading day -1. The mean 
abnormal returns on trading days -1 and 0 are 1.1% and 1.2% respectively. The abnormal returns 
on trading day +1 are not statistically different than zero, but the average abnormal returns on 
trading day +2 is a statistically significant -0.8%. In the bottom five rows of Panel A, we show 
the average CARs accumulated over different event windows. The mean target CARs over the (-
1,+1) and (-5,+5) windows are 2.5% and 3.3%, respectively. While these estimates are 
statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, the median values are not. This 
shows the importance of reporting the mean and median values of the abnormal return 
distributions. The remaining event windows specifications aim to capture the market reactions in 
the pre-announcement period by accumulating the abnormal returns 126 trading days before the 
DA. The mean CARs over the (-126,-5) event window is 9.8%, which is significant at the 1% 
level. Hence, an event window that does not even capture the stock market reaction at the merger 
announcement date yields statistically positive and sizable abnormal returns. When the event 
windows are extended to include the market reactions in the announcement and post-
announcement periods, the CAR estimates grow larger. The mean CARs over the (-126,+5) 
event window is 12.8%, while the mean CARs over the (-126,+126) event window is 17.4%. 
 
[Table 3] 
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Compared to the other studies in the literature, the market reactions immediately around 
DA seem quite small. Panel B provides the evidence as to why this is the case. As discussed 
earlier, in 78 of the deals in our sample, the possibility of a merger is released to the stock market 
in the pre-DA period. For these target firms, the mean abnormal returns are positive and 
statistically significant starting five trading days before the ODA. The mean abnormal returns to 
the target firms on trading days -2, -1 and 0 are 1%, 2% and 2.8%, respectively. The median 
abnormal returns on these dates are also statistically positive. The resulting CARs estimated 
around (-1,+1) and (-5,+5) are 5.5% and 6.7%, respectively. Even for this subsample, where the 
merger-related information is supposed to be released to the stock market the first time at ODA, 
the abnormal returns in the pre-ODA period are significantly positive: the mean target CARs 
around the (-63,-5) period is 8.5%. There could be potential reasons behind the run-up in the pre-
ODA period, though market anticipation and private information trading are the most possible 
explanations. 
8
 
 
We should note that the CAR estimates in Panel B are higher than are the CAR estimates 
in Panel A. We therefore infer that performing event studies around only DA yields biased 
results because it ignores market reactions to the merger-related events released prior to DA. In 
other words, the stock market incorporates the information released at ODA into the stock prices 
of target firms, and as a result, the merger announcements at DA do not come as a surprise to the 
market. Following Mulherin and Simsir (2014), we incorporate the market reactions around 
ODA and DA by using event windows that include both dates. In Panel C, we report target CAR 
estimates over four different event windows. The first one accumulates target abnormal returns 
starting one trading day before ODA and ending one trading day after DA. The mean CARs over 
this event window is 8.1%, which is fairly close to the summation of the individual market 
reactions around ODA and DA. The second event window uses five trading days as cutoff 
points. The mean target CARs over this event window is 9.6%. The next two event windows 
                                                          
8
 The anticipation of mergers by investors is another factor that affects the stock prices of merging firms before the 
formal merger announcement dates (Cremers, Nair and John (2009), Cornett, Tanyeri, Tehranian (2011), Edmans, 
Goldstein and Jiang (2012) and Betton, Eckbo, Thompson, Thorburn (2013)). Some of the merger related events that 
appear in our sample may have materialized as a result of traders’ merger anticipation efforts. For instance, the 
excessive trading activity of the anticipating investors could help spread merger rumors about the possibility of a 
deal. While analyzing the interaction between merger anticipation and the existence of merger-related events before 
the formal announcement dates is interesting, we do not undertake this endeavor in this paper.  
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extend to the post-DA period to capture the market reactions after the merger announcement is 
made public at DA. The mean CARs measured starting five trading days before ODA to 126 
trading days after DA is 12.5%. Including the pre-ODA period to the above event window results 
in larger abnormal return estimates: the target CARs accumulated starting 63 trading days before 
ODA to 126 trading days after DA has a mean of 17.7%. The median values for all of the four 
CAR measures are significantly lower than their mean values, implying that the distribution of 
abnormal returns is positively skewed. 
9
 
 
3.2. Bid Premiums 
 
The second method of measuring the wealth effects of mergers is estimating bid premiums, 
which is calculated as offer price minus benchmark price divided by the benchmark price. 
Benchmark price is target firms’ stock price before the merger announcement date, when target 
firms’ stock prices do not reflect the merger-related information. The typical choices for the 
benchmark date are 42 or 63 trading days before the merger announcement date. 
10
 
 
We estimate bid premiums using three different methods. First, we calculate bid 
premiums using the offer price data available in SDC. Second, we hand-collect the offer price 
data from news articles, BIST and CMBT bulletins. In both cases, the benchmark price is target 
firms’ stock price 4 weeks (21 trading days) before the DA. Our objective in estimating bid 
premiums using SDC and hand-collected offer prices is to investigate the extent to which the use 
of SDC as the primary source of information would lead to a comprehensive analysis of bid 
premiums. The third and final method of estimating bid premiums is identical to the second one 
except that the benchmark date is set as target firms’ stock price 4 weeks before ODA. Our 
objective in estimating bid premiums around ODA is to investigate whether estimating bid 
premiums around DA and around ODA would yield similar results. 
 
                                                          
9
 We compare corrected target CARs across subsamples that are defined with respect to deal characteristics, such as 
financial versus non-financial targets, minority versus majority acquisitions, large versus small targets, and foreign 
versus domestic acquirers. These results are omitted from the paper due to space constraints, though interested 
readers may request them from the corresponding author.  
10
 In contrast with target CARs, bid premiums measure the ex-post wealth effects of the announced mergers. Eckbo 
(2009) discusses the differences between CARs and bid premiums as estimates of the wealth effects of mergers. 
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Panel D of Table 3 shows the three alternative bid premium measures. The use of offer 
price data from SDC yields 21 bid premium estimates, which is less than half of what we get 
from collecting the offer price data on our own. The mean value for the bid premiums estimated 
from SDC is 19.3%, which is very close to the mean bid premium estimates for the hand-
collected sample (18.4%). However, the median values significantly differ from each other. The 
third bid premium measure, which is estimated using a benchmark price relative to ODA, has a 
mean of 28.4%. The median value for this bid premium measure is 11.9%. These values are in 
contrast with the bid premium estimates that are calculated using DA as the event date. Taken 
together, our findings suggest that (i) estimating bid premiums using SDC data results in missing 
observations and (ii) bid premiums are estimated more accurately when the benchmark prices are 
based on ODA rather than DA.  
 
4. Multivariate Analysis of Target CARs and Bid Premiums 
 
One of the important focal points of the empirical M&A literature is the cross-sectional 
determinants of target CARs and bid premiums. These cross sectional determinants are typically 
the deal, target, and acquiring firm characteristics, such as the method of payment (Travlos 
(1987), Chang (1998), Faccio and Masulis (2005)), form of acquisition (Jensen and Ruback 
(1983), Huang and Walkling (1987)), asset relatedness (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)), 
hostility (Schwert (2000)), competition (Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Boone and Mulherin 
(2007)), relative size (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983)), toehold (Betton and Eckbo (2000)), 
termination fees (Officer (2003)), target and acquirer Tobin’s Q (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling 
(1991) and Servaes (1991)), target leverage (Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell (1993)), 
acquirer cash flow (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989)), acquirer cash holdings (Harford (1999)), 
and acquirer size (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)). Our objective in this section is to 
investigate the determinants of target CARs and bid premiums in Turkish transactions, in 
conjunction with the measurement error issue discussed in Section 3. Unfortunately, the majority 
of the deal characteristics that are used in developed M&A markets are not available as control 
variables in Turkish transactions. For instance, stock payments, termination fees and hostile 
deals rarely happen in Turkey. M&A markets in Turkey are at their infancy; the players are not 
completely aware of the tools commonly used in developed M&A markets, and most 
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importantly, the use of these tools are hindered by the fact that Turkish firms are not diffusely 
held by the public.  
 
We aim to explain the cross-sectional variation in target CARs and bid premiums using 
five control variables: percent owned after transaction, privatization indicator, asset relatedness, 
EBITDA/Sales ratio and ln(Total Assets). 
11
 The construction of these variables is explained in 
the Table 2. We also include in the regressions broadly defined industry and year indicators. We 
limit the number of control variables to five because the number of observations in our dataset 
shrinks considerably when financial targets are excluded from the analysis. The operations of 
financial firms, hence their balance sheets, structurally differ than those of non-financial firms. 
The usual handling of this heterogeneity in the sample completely excludes financial firms from 
the analysis. We also do not include acquirer financial characteristics to the regressions due to 
data limitations. Restricting our analysis to public acquirers reduces the number of observations 
to less than 15 in regressions (4) to (6), as only 39% of the acquirers are public.  
 
Table 4 shows the regression results. In the first two columns of Table 4, the dependent 
variable is the CAR estimates based on DA. Researchers unaware of information events related 
at ODA would have run the econometric model shown in the first column. We then add the ODA 
dummy to the regression to investigate whether the coefficient of the ODA dummy would have a 
negative sign and whether the coefficients of the other control variables would change after the 
addition of the ODA dummy. We find that the coefficient of the ODA dummy variable is -
0.0684, meaning that the target firm CARs measured in the (-5,+5) period is 6.8 percentage 
points lower for the group of deals having ODA values. This result is consistent with our 
findings in Section 3, where we show that ignoring the market reaction to the merger-related 
news released at ODA yields smaller CAR estimates measured around DA. In the third column, 
we attempt to correct CAR estimates by taking an event window that starts 5 trading days before 
ODA and ends 5 trading days after DA. Under this model, target size has a significantly negative 
                                                          
11
 The existence of blockholders in target firms could potentially affect the premiums paid to target firms. The float 
rate, defined as the number of shares trading in the stock market divided by the number of shares outstanding, is 
therefore a potentially interesting variable that should be added as a control variable in our regressions. However, 
CMBT required public firms and BIST to report standardized float rate measures after the end of 2010, which 
corresponds to the end of our data period. The float rate data before the end of 2010 is not reliable; hence we do not 
use the float rate variable in our estimations. 
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coefficient of -0.041, meaning that larger targets experience lower CARs during the event period, 
compared with smaller targets. This finding is consistent with the size effect discussed in the 
extant literature.  
 
[Table 4] 
 
We repeat the above procedure using the bid premium measures as the dependent 
variables. Because the use of bid premiums reduces the sample size to 38 observations, we 
exclude “percent owned after transaction” and “privatization dummy” variables from the 
regressions. We also do not include industry and year indicators. These variables do not turn out 
significant in alternative specifications of the econometric model. The regression output in the 
fourth column, where the dependent variable is the bid premiums estimated using the hand-
collected data, shows that the significant determinants of bid premiums are asset relatedness and 
target firm profitability. When the merging firms are in the same industry, the bid premiums are 
33.7 percentage points lower than when they are in different industries. The existing studies in 
the literature tend to associate asset relatedness with the synergies created from mergers. Our 
evidence suggests that the potential synergies, if exist, are not reaped by Turkish target firms 
during merger negotiations. Profitable target firms receive higher bid premiums than do others: a 
10 percentage point increase in profitability results in 2.4 percentage points increase in bid 
premiums. In the fifth column, we keep the econometric model the same as in the fourth column, 
except that we add the ODA indicator. The coefficient of the ODA indicator do not turn out to be 
significant, and the coefficients of the other control variables are similar to the coefficients in the 
fourth column. In the sixth column, we measure bid premiums using ODA as the event date and 
re-run the regression in the fourth column. The coefficients of asset relatedness indicator and 
target firm profitability measure change slightly but the regressions results are very similar to the 
one in the fourth column otherwise.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We investigate whether the deal announcement dates provided in SDC are accurate for Turkish 
M&A transactions. Because announcement dates are essential elements in event studies, using 
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correct event dates are necessary for achieving unbiased abnormal returns estimates. Following a 
similar methodology discussed in Mulherin and Simsir (2014), we examine the frequency of 
early merger-related events in Turkish M&A transactions and the potential biases that come with 
the exclusion of such events. 74.3% of the target firms in our sample are involved in merger-
related events before the formal announcement dates provided in SDC. The market reacts 
significantly to the events released around ODA. In fact, the average market reaction around 
ODA is greater than the market reaction around DA, SDC’s formal merger announcement dates. 
Our evidence suggests that merger-related events taking place at ODA increase the likelihood of 
subsequent merger announcements and therefore result in significant market reactions when 
released. Therefore, the formal agreement announcement at DA does not come as a surprise to 
the stock market.  
 
The existing studies in the literature suggest that the wealth effects of mergers in 
emerging countries are lower than the wealth effects of mergers in developed markets. We infer 
from our findings that the difference between the estimates in these two subsamples may exist 
partially due to the frequency of the merger-related events taking place before the consummation 
of the mergers in emerging markets and SDC’s coverage of these events in its dataset. When we 
use event windows in our event studies that capture the market reactions around ODA, we end 
up with significantly larger CAR estimates. Our findings also provide evidence that SDC is 
incomplete in terms of the bid premiums paid to target firms in Turkish M&A transactions. Bid 
premium estimates that are based on DA are significantly lower than the bid premium estimates 
based on ODA. We therefore suggest using ODA to choose benchmark prices when bid 
premiums are used to measure the wealth effects of mergers in Turkish transactions.  
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Table 1. Types of merger-related information released at ODA 
This table shows the types of merger-related news released before the formal announcement 
dates (DA). We filter through SDC the deals conforming to the following criterion: (i) Deals are 
announced between January 1
st
 2005 and December 31
st
 2011, (ii) Target firms are Turkish and 
public firms, (iii) The announced deals are eventually completed. If a firm appears in SDC as a 
target firm more than once within 5 days of the merger announcement date, we eliminate the 
duplicate observations. The resulting sample is searched in Stockground for their stock price 
data. For each deal in our sample, we search news sources such as newspapers, Istanbul Stock 
Exchange and Capital Markets Board of Turkey Bulletins for merger related news. 
 
    
Number of calendar 
days between ODA and 
DA 
Content of merger related news at early dates Number Percent 
 
mean median 
Target announces early-stage merger negotiations 40 51.28% 
 
145 119 
Merger rumors are published in press 19 24.36% 
 
235 261 
Search for buyer is disclosed 17 21.79% 
 
223 244 
Other 2 2.56% 
 
185 185 
Total 78 100.00% 
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Table 2. Data summary 
This table summarizes the deal and merging firm characteristics of our sample. The sample formation steps are explained in Table 1. 
“Tender offer” takes a value of 1 if the deal is classified as tender offer in SDC, 0 otherwise. “Asset relatedness” takes a value of 1 if 
the two-digit SIC codes of the target firm and the acquirer firm matches, 0 otherwise (source: SDC). “ODA dummy” takes a value of 1 
if an ODA value exists for the target firm, 0 otherwise. “Percent owned after transaction” is the percent of target firm shares that is 
owned by the acquirer firm after the transaction (SDC). “Privatization dummy” takes a value of 1 if the deal involves privatization of 
the target firm, 0 otherwise. “Public acquirer” takes a value of 1 if the acquirer is a public firm, 0 otherwise (SDC). “Foreign acquirer” 
takes a value of 1 if the acquirer is a non-Turkish firm, 0 otherwise (SDC). Target firm financial characteristics are shown in Panel B. 
The financial data are imported from Stockground and they are taken from the most recent financial statements of target firms before 
the merger announcement date. “Quick ratio” is (Cash & Bank Deposits + Marketable Securities) / Short-term liabilities. “P/E” ratio is 
the price-earnings ratio. “EBITDA/Sales” is EBITDA divided by the total sales of the target firm. “Total Assets” is the book value of 
assets of the target firm (in Turkish Lira). “Book leverage” is (Short-term liabilities + Long-term liabilities) / Total Assets of the target 
firm. “Non-financial industry” takes a value of 1 if the target firm is not in the financial industry, 0 otherwise (SDC).  
Panel A. Deal characteristics N mean median min max 
standard 
deviation 
Tender offer  105 0.076 0 0 1 0.267 
Asset relatedness 105 0.381 0 0 1 0.488 
ODA dummy 105 0.743 1 0 1 0.439 
Percent owned after transaction 104 0.492 0.510 0.032 1 0.305 
Privatization dummy 105 0.029 0 0 1 0.167 
Public acquirer 105 0.390 0 0 1 0.490 
Foreign acquirer 105 0.448 0 0 1 0.500 
Panel B. Target characteristics             
Quick ratio 70 1.655 0.135 0.002 41.49 6.94 
P/E ratio 69 19.702 8.309 -130.135 301.35 61.58 
EBITDA/Sales 69 0.001 0.084 -3.936 0.941 0.718 
Total Assets 70 2,010.00 285.00 13.40 43,400 5,520 
Book leverage 70 0.519 0.506 0.008 1.292 0.311 
Non-financial industry 105 0.724 1 0 1 0.449 
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Table 3. Target CARs and bid premiums around event dates 
This table shows target firm abnormal returns around DA and ODA. The sample formation steps 
are explained in Table 1. We use a market model to estimate target CARs. In Panel A, the event 
date is DA. We estimate the parameters of the market model over (-819,-315). In Panel B, the 
event date is ODA. We estimate the parameters of the market model over (-567,-63). In both 
cases, we do not estimate market model parameters if the number of observations in the 
estimation window is less than 250. Using the parameters of the market model, we estimate the 
expected (or normal) returns in the event window. Abnormal returns (AR) are defined as realized 
returns minus expected returns. Target CARs are defined as the summation of the abnormal 
returns in the event window. In Panel C, the event windows are defined using both ODA and 
DA. For instance, CAR from ODA -1 to DA +1 accumulates abnormal returns one day before 
ODA to one trading day after DA. For deals not having ODA, we accumulate abnormal returns 
one day before DA to one day after DA. In Panel D, bid premiums are calculated as (offer price 
– benchmark price) / benchmark price. Bid premium (SDC) is the premium value provided in 
SDC. The benchmark price is based on target firm stock price 4 weeks before DA. We also use 
hand-collected data to calculate bid premiums. The benchmark date in bid premium (hand-
collected) is 4 weeks before DA, while the benchmark date in Bid Premium based on ODA 
(hand-collected) is 4 weeks before ODA. Except for Panel D, t-values are based on the 
standardized cross-sectional test with serial dependence correction (as explained in Campbell et. 
al (2010)). z-values are based on Wilcoxon sign-rank tests. In both cases, the null hypothesis is 
that the mean or the median of the distribution is equal to zero. *** denotes significance level at 
the 1% level, ** for the 5% level and * for the 10% level. 
Panel A. Target CARs 
around DA 
N mean median t-value z-value 
AR at trading day -5 101 0.002 0.000 1.12 0.44 
AR at trading day -4 101 0.004* 0.000 1.67 0.42 
AR at trading day -3 101 0.005 -0.001 1.46 0.35 
AR at trading day -2 101 0.003 0.000 0.93 -0.31 
AR at trading day -1 99 0.011** 0.002 2.19 0.95 
AR at trading day 0 96 0.012** 0.005* 2.23 1.70 
AR at trading day +1 94 0.004 -0.005 0.71 -0.22 
AR at trading day +2 98 -0.008*** -0.009*** -3.15 -3.79 
AR at trading day +3 99 -0.002 -0.005* -1.19 -1.90 
AR at trading day +4 100 0.001 -0.004 0.12 -0.88 
AR at trading day +5 100 0.002 -0.003 0.74 -1.02 
CAR over (-1,+1) 105 0.025*** 0.002 2.73 1.57 
CAR over (-5,+5) 105 0.033** 0.000 2.09 1.03 
CAR over (-126,-5) 105 0.098*** 0.056** 2.92 2.57 
CAR over (-126,+5) 105 0.128*** 0.082*** 3.62 3.05 
CAR over (-126,+126) 105 0.174*** 0.084*** 3.09 2.82 
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Panel B. Target CARs 
around ODA 
N mean median t-value z-value 
AR at trading day -5 76 0.006 -0.001 1.63 0.66 
AR at trading day -4 76 0.009** -0.001 2.40 0.25 
AR at trading day -3 76 0.006 -0.003 1.41 0.06 
AR at trading day -2 77 0.010** 0.003* 1.98 1.78 
AR at trading day -1 77 0.020*** 0.007*** 3.44 3.51 
AR at trading day 0 77 0.028*** 0.010*** 4.14 3.21 
AR at trading day +1 77 0.008 -0.005 1.29 -0.24 
AR at trading day +2 77 -0.001 -0.004 -0.46 -1.08 
AR at trading day +3 77 0.000 -0.006 -0.35 -1.11 
AR at trading day +4 77 -0.011*** -0.006*** -3.33 -3.02 
AR at trading day +5 77 -0.005 -0.004 -0.85 -1.39 
CAR over (-1,+1) 78 0.055*** 0.024*** 5.26 3.97 
CAR over (-5,+5) 78 0.067*** 0.037*** 4.08 3.84 
CAR over (-63,-5) 78 0.085*** 0.042* 2.59 1.76 
CAR over (-63,+5) 78 0.146*** 0.083*** 4.32 3.33 
CAR over (-63,+126) 78 0.186*** 0.053** 3.18 2.40 
      
Panel C. Alternative event 
windows 
N mean median t-value z-value 
CAR from ODA -1 to DA +1 105 0.081*** 0.028*** 3.56 2.97 
CAR from ODA -5 to DA +5 105 0.096*** 0.020** 3.78 2.53 
CAR from ODA -5 to DA 
+126 
105 0.125*** 0.009* 2.80 1.84 
CAR from ODA -63 to DA 
+126 
105 0.177*** 0.060*** 3.30 2.76 
      
Panel D. Bid premiums N mean median t-value z-value 
Bid premium based on DA 
(SDC) 
21 0.193 0.121* 1.45 1.755 
Bid premium based on DA 
(hand-collected) 
56 0.184** 0.024** 2.60 2.325 
Bid premium based on ODA 
(hand-collected) 
56 0.284*** 0.119*** 3.51 3.03 
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Table 4. OLS regressions 
This table presents the OLS model explaining the CARs and bid premiums experienced by target 
firms. The sample formation steps are explained in Table 1. The estimation of target CARs are 
explained in Table 3. The estimation of bid premium measures is explained in Table 4. ODA 
dummy takes a value of 1 if the target firm has an ODA date. The remaining explanatory 
variables are explained in Table 2. “Target SIC; 0 or 1” equals 1 if the first digit of the target 
firm’s SIC code is either 0 or 1. The remaining industry dummies are defined similarly. “After 
2009 dummy” takes a value of 1 for deals announced after (including) 2009. *** denotes 
significance level at the 1% level, ** for the 5% level and * for the 10% level. 
 
CAR 
over  
(-5,+5), 
relative 
to DA 
CAR 
over  
(-5,+5), 
relative 
to DA 
CAR 
from 
ODA -5 
to DA +5  
Bid 
premium 
(hand-
collected), 
relative to 
DA 
Bid 
premium 
(hand-
collected), 
relative to 
DA 
Bid 
premium 
(hand-
collected), 
relative to 
ODA 
ODA dummy 
 
-0.0684* 
  
0.273 
 
  
(-1.721) 
  
(1.315) 
 
Percent owned after transaction 0.0957 0.0959 0.0299 
   
 
(1.528) (1.558) (0.207) 
   
Privatization dummy -0.0831 -0.0673 0.234 
   
 
(-0.956) (-0.783) (1.167) 
   
Asset relatedness 0.0463 0.0386 -0.0836 -0.337* -0.310 -0.399* 
 
(1.206) (1.014) (-0.945) (-1.824) (-1.689) (-1.731) 
EBITDA/Sales -0.00640 -0.0172 -0.00804 0.239** 0.283** 0.250* 
 
(-0.234) (-0.625) (-0.128) (2.292) (2.610) (1.923) 
ln(Total Assets) -0.00153 0.000354 -0.0417* -0.00183 -0.0173 -0.0338 
 
(-0.142) (0.0331) (-1.674) (-0.0350) (-0.326) (-0.516) 
After 2009 dummy 0.0360 0.0275 -0.0629 0.291 0.334 0.318 
 
(0.867) (0.669) (-0.660) (1.384) (1.589) (1.213) 
Target SIC; 0 or 1 0.00167 0.00890 0.110 
   
 
(0.0273) (0.148) (0.782) 
   
Target SIC; 2 or 3 0.0432 0.0406 0.306* 
   
 
(0.589) (0.563) (1.814) 
   
Target SIC; 4 0.0446 0.0669 0.307 
   
 
(0.454) (0.686) (1.359) 
   
Target SIC; 5 0.0498 0.0622 0.316 
   
 
(0.603) (0.763) (1.665) 
   
Constant -0.0637 -0.0485 0.669 0.0790 0.158 0.787 
 
(-0.306) (-0.237) (1.396) (0.0729) (0.147) (0.582) 
Observations 68 68 68 38 38 38 
Adj. R-square -0.003 0.030 -0.024 0.135 0.154 0.093 
 
